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This note is a demonstration that, in the presence of overlapping genera-
tions and under standard conditions for a social welfare ordering (Pareto
optimality, transitivity, independence), the only ordering consistent with
utilitarianism for all people currently alive at any given point in time is one
based on weighting all people equally, regardless of their date of birth. In
particular, this implies that, under reasonable conditions, the appropriate
choice for the pure rate of social time preference is equal to zero.1 Introduction
One of the longest running controversies in welfare economics has concerned
the appropriateness of discounting future utility. As Schelling (1995) ob-
serves, the predominant view in the economics literature is that the appro-
priate discounting procedure should include a pure rate of time preference,
reecting individual preferences for utility in the present relative to utility
in the future. However, beginning with Ramsey (1928), whose work is the
starting point for formal analysis of intertemporal choices, many writers have
rejected the inherent discounting of future utility as ethically unjustied, and
this viewpoint is shared by many philosophical advocates of utilitarianism.
The inclusion or exclusion of a pure rate of time preference in the eval-
uation of social policy is a matter of great practical signicance. With the
most common choice of pure time preference rate (3 per cent), the discount
factor for a period of 25 years is below 0.5 and for a period of 100 years the
discount factor is below 1/16. In particular, assuming that the utility of life
as opposed to death does not change over time, this implies that a policy
that saved one life today would be justied even if it cost, with certainty,
15 lives a century in the future.
The treatment of pure time preference has critical implications for the
assessment of responses to climate change. Stern (2007) argues that the
costs of inaction on climate change are high enough to justify a program
aimed at stabilising atmospheric levels of CO2 at 550 parts per million or
lower. Nordhaus (2007) shows that this conclusion depends critically on
the exclusion of inherent time preference from discounting, which, given
logarithmic utility, leads to the use of a real discount rate approximately
equal to the rate of consumption growth (around 2 per cent a year in Stern's
analysis). Inclusion of inherent time preference leads to a preference for a
`climate-policy ramp' in which costly reductions in emissions are deferred to
the future.1
Much of the debate on the question of whether a pure rate of time
preference can be justied is concerned with determining the appropriate
way to balance the interests of `current' and `future' generations. The central
question, in this framing of the problem, is whether, and to what extent,
members of the current generation have the right to allocate resources in
their own favour, at the expense of unborn future generations.
The central point of this note is to observe that this way of posing the
problem is invalid, because members of dierent generations are alive at
the same time. Any policy that discounts future utility must discriminate
1Nordhaus justies the use of a high discount rate, incorporating pure social time
preference. However, as noted by Quiggin (2008), the real rate of interest on low-risk
bonds is close to the (risk-free) discount rate proposed by Stern. The fact that the average
rate of return to capital is signicantly higher than the real bond rate is a manifestation
of the equity premium puzzle, rst noted by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
1not merely against generations yet unborn but against the current younger
generation. Assuming that members of any given generation are concerned
about their own lifetime utility, rather than myopically concerned with cur-
rent utility alone, a social allocation rule that incorporates pure time pref-
erence gives higher weight to the lifetime utility of earlier-born generations.
Assuming a 3 per cent pure rate of time preference, as above, and 25 years
between generations, the lifetime welfare of those aged 50 or more is valued
twice as highly as the welfare of their children, and four times as highly as
the welfare of their grandchildren, all of whom may be alive at the same
time. This is obviously inconsistent with any form of utilitarianism in which
all those currently alive are valued equally.
Furthermore, by the nature of overlapping generations, there is no point
at which a coherent distinction between current and future generations can
be drawn. In the absence of some general catastrophe, many children alive
today will still be alive in 2100, at which time people already alive will
reasonably be able to anticipate the possibility of survival beyond 2200.
The main formal contribution of this note is a demonstration that, in
the presence of overlapping generations and under standard conditions for
a social welfare ordering (Pareto optimality, transitivity, independence), the
only ordering consistent with utilitarianism for all people currently alive at
any given point in time is one based on weighting all people equally, regard-
less of their date of birth. In particular, this implies that, under reasonable
conditions, the appropriate choice for the pure rate of social time preference
is equal to zero. Some implications are derived, followed by some concluding
comments.
2 Main Result
Consider an economy in discrete time t = 1:::T with overlapping generations,
Generation t, born in period t, lives for two periods, t and t+1. Consumption
for generation t is given by the pair ct = (ct
t;ct
(t+1)), where ct 2 <M is a
vector of consumption goods. Preferences for generation t are represented
by a utility function, additively separable over time, of the form











where ui; i = 1;2 are utility functions for consumption in lifetime period i:
The functions ui are independent of t. The special case
u2 (c) = bu1 (c);8c 2 <M; (2)
where b  1 is a discount factor; is of particular interest. In this case, con-
sumption preferences do not change over the lifecycle, but individuals prefer
consumption in lifetime period 1 (when they are young) to consumption in
period 2 (when they are old).












Given the assumption of additive separability, we may summarise social



















t = 1:::T so that






It is a matter of convenience whether we undertake analysis
A utility prole U =
 
u1;:;ut;::uT
is a set of utility vectors, one for




prole U with ut replaced by u:
We now consider the problem of dening a social ordering  on sets of




horizon may be taken to represent a point beyond which all consumption
proles converge, so that the social ordering is unaected by the consump-
tion of generations after after T. The ordering must satisfy the following
conditions:
Axiom 1 A.1 Pareto optimality: For U; ^ U such that ^ ut




t = 1;:::T with strict inequality for at least one t; ^ U  U:
Axiom 2 A.2.Transitivity: If U0  U; U00  U0 then U00  U:




Axiom 4 A.4 Utilitarianism within periods: For U; ^ U such that
^ ut




t = 1:::T with strict inequality for at least one t; ^ U  U:
Axioms A.1{3 are standard. The crucial axiom is A.4 which requires
that any change in consumption within a time period t that increases aggre-
gate utility in that period must increase social welfare as measured by the
ordering  : That is, utilitiarianism must hold within periods. In interpret-
ing this requirement, it is useful to consider the special case of preferences
satisfying additive separability with a utility discount factor, given by equa-
tion (2). Under these preferences, all individuals derive more lifetime utility
from consuming any given bundle when young than from consuming the
same bundle when old. Hence, starting from an initial position of equality,
3a transfer of consumption from the current old generation to the current
young generation will yield an increase in social welfare, just like a similar
transfer of consumption from old to young in the course of the lifetime of a
given generation.
Given these axioms it is straightforward to derive our main result:
Proposition 5 For a social ordering satisfying 1-4, ^ U  U if and only if
(i)
P
t ^ V t =
P
t ^ ut










t ^ Wt =
P
t ^ ut











t : ut 6= ^ ut	
The proof is by induction on T. For T = 1; the result follows immediately
from Pareto-optimality. To clarify the exposition, we will rst derive the


































































and hence, by A.1, u  u000; so, by A.3, u  u0. Now assume the result





























and the inductive step now follows from A.4. The equivalence with (ii) is
immediate.
4Proposition 1 contradicts the widely held intuition that if individuals
prefer earlier to later consumption, respect for individual preferences im-
plies that a similar preference should be incorporated in social preference
orderings. As argued in the introduction, this intuition reects a confusion
between intertemporal preferences and life-cycle eects within generations.
In life-cycle terms, a consistent preference for consumption earlier rather
than later means a preference for consumption when young over consump-
tion when old. This preference has implications for the allocation of re-
sources over the life-cycle of any given generation, but it does not support
a preference for later-born over earlier born generations. In fact, consistent
preference for consumption when young over consumption when old implies
that (given an initial position of constant consumption) a transfer of con-
sumption in every generation from the currently old to the currently young
will raise the welfare of all generations.
Corollary 6 Consider utility proles u and ^ u such that, for each time pe-
riod t,
ut
1   ^ ut
1 = u
(t 1)
2   ^ u
(t 1)
2 = t:
That is, within each period, the change from u to u0 aects both gener-
ations equally
Then u is preferred to u0 if and only if
X
t > 0;
that is, if the undiscounted sum of utility dierences is positive.
2.1 Additive separability with impatience
The results derived above are of particular interest for the case of additively
separable preferences displaying utility discounting, represented in equation
(2).
First, consider the social decision problem of setting C =
 
c1;:::cT
to allocate a xed quantity K of a single consumption good. Assume for
simplicity that u displays constant relative risk aversion and dene  < 1




It is easy to see that the optimal solution consistent with conditions A.1-4
must set
ct = (^ c;^ c);t = 1:::T
^ c =
K
T (1 + )
:
5That is, with a xed quantity to allocate, impatience means that each
generation will choose a lifetime consumption path in which consumption
is high in period 1, when individuals are young, and lower when they are
old. However, since the lifetime utility of all generations is valued equally,
the consumption of each generation is the same. This example illustrates
the distinction between inherent preference, within a generation, for con-
sumption early in life (which is consistent with Proposition 5) and inherent
preference for one generation over another (which is not).
Next, suppose that the consumption vector c consists of a private con-
sumption good x and a public good y; and that the utility functions are of
the form:
u1 (x;y) = w(x) + y
u2 (x;y) =  (w(x) + y)
for some function w: Now consider a unit transfer of the public good y from
period t to period t+1: This will reduce the utility of generation t by 1 
utility units, since this generation is young in period t and old in period
t+1: But this reduction in social welfare is exactly oset by the dierences
between the utility gain to generation t + 1 (young in period t + 1) and
the utility loss to generation t   1 (old in period t): Hence, for given x; the
optimal policy is that which maximizes the available quantity of the public
good, regardless of when it is enjoyed.
Finally, consider the extension of the analysis above to the case of a
continuous-time model with nitely-lived individuals. It is apparent that
the axioms presented above can be modied to t the continuous time case,
and that the conclusion of Proposition 5 will apply, yielding the Ramsey
rule of saving as the optimal social policy.
3 Concluding comments
The central insight of the overlapping generations model is that economic in-
teractions between contemporaneous earlier-born and later-born generations
are crucial to the determination of the time paths of output, consumption
and investment. Yet discussion of intergenerational issues in discounting
is largely based on a distinction between `current' and `future' generations
that makes no sense in an overlapping generations model. This in turn has
contributed to a confusion between individual preferences over current and
future consumption, and social preferences regarding the equitable alloca-
tion of resources within a given generation.
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